Obscenity Control and Minors - The Case for a Separate Standard by Edward T. Fagan
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 10 
Number 4 Volume 10, Autumn 1964, Number 4 Article 3 
October 2016 
Obscenity Control and Minors - The Case for a Separate Standard 
Edward T. Fagan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward T. Fagan (1964) "Obscenity Control and Minors - The Case for a Separate Standard," The Catholic 
Lawyer: Vol. 10 : No. 4 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol10/iss4/3 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
OBSCENITY CONTROL
AND MINORS-
The Case for a Separate Standard
EDWARD T. FAGAN*t
Introduction
T HE LONG ANTICIPATED CLARIFICATION of what is meant by totally
suppressible obscene material' was finally made last June by the
United States Supreme Court. Jacobellis v. Ohio,' coupled with its two
companion per curiam decisions, Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein3 and
Tralins v. Gerstein,4 limited such material to hard core pornography on
the ground that such material is utterly void of socially redeeming im-
portance.5
While this clarification did not come as much of a surprise, 6 that which
truly confounded the legal world was the totally inexplicable decision
of the New York Court of Appeals a month later in People v. Bookcase,
Inc.7 In this case the court declared unconstitutional a statute which
provided protection solely to minors against those who sought to dis-
tribute obscene material to them for profit. The identical statute, which
had also been enacted in Rhode Island, had been declared constitutional
in 1959 by the Rhode Island high court in State v. Settle."
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; Editor of The Catholic
Lawyer.
t The author is indebted to the St. Thomas More Institute staff for research as-
sistance in the preparation of this article.
'Fagan, Editorial Comment, 9 CATHOLIc LAW. 267 (1963).
2 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
3378 U.S. 577 (1964).
4 378 U.S. 576 (1964).
5 What however is hard core pornography? Mr. Justice Stewart admits, in his
concurring opinion, that he cannot define it but he knows it when he sees it.
Supra note 2, at 197.
6 See Regan, Freedom of the Mind and Justice Brennan, 9 CATHOLIC LAW. 269,
276 (1963).
7 14 N.Y.2d 409, 201 N.E.2d 14, 252 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964).
8 90 R.I. 195, 156 A.2d 921 (1959).
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The Rhode Island case had also been
cited with approval by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan in his opinion in the Jacobellis case 9
as an example of proper remedial legisla-
tion governing sales of obscene material to
minors.
The net result of these recent cases has
been to leave the children of New York
State almost completely vulnerable to the
poison dispensed by those who traffic in
obscenity for profit.1" It is imperative,
therefore, that all responsible members of
the community take immediate action to
re-establish appropriate legal safeguards
for children against this danger. Lawyers,
of necessity, must be the leaders in such
remedial activity.
It is obvious to all students of law and
to others who are interested in the partic-
ular aspect of law dealing with censorship
that governmental regulation of obscenity
has already been exhaustively analysed and
discussed by a myriad of experts and
jurists.11 Numerous arguments have been
advanced in the past by the "Philistines"
who advocate variable standards as the
basis for determining suppressible ob-
. Supra note 2, at 195 n.l 1.
10 New York is not alone in this predicament.
Other states in a similar situation are California
and Maryland.
11 Without endeavoring to furnish a complete
bibliography, the following are suggested in their
respective fields. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIA-
TION, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1960) (a general
survey of the problem-a complete collection
of materials). Lockhart & McClure, Literature,
The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38
MINN. L. REV. 295 (1954); Lockhart & Mc-
Clure, Censorship of Obscenity; The Developing
Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5
(1960) (a complete survey of the law to mid-
1960); Hayes, The Law of Obscenity, 8 CATHO-
LIC LAW. 93 (1962); ST. JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCEN-
ITY AND THE LAW (1956).
scenity on the adult level or who support
the extension of the definition of legal ob-
scenity to include all materials which might
remotely smack of the licentious or the in-
decent. The "Libertarians" have been
equally emphatic in their denunciations of
any curbs whatsoever on the freedom of
artistic expression. In effect, a torrent of
writing has already been loosed-official,
legal, psychological and lay.
For all practical purposes, further dis-
cussion and disputation in this area seems
at first blush to have become academic. We
now know that hard core pornography is
all that can be removed from the adult
book market. However, what has not been
satisfactorily established to date is the ex-
act nature of obscene material which, in
addition to hard core pornography, can
legally be barred from sale to minors. Too
many people are prone to conclude that
only hard core pornography can be with-
held from both child and adult as a result
of present Supreme Court and state court
pronouncements. This conclusion is un-
warranted.
Scope of Article
The aim of this article, therefore, is two-
fold. First, it shall delineate the separate
classification, in law, of minors as a pro-
spective audience for obscenity. This dis-
tinction has been uniformly recognized and
accepted throughout the evolution of ob-
scenity law and continues to exist to the
present time. Recognition of such separate
status becomes meaningful only if it further
extends to the acceptance of a separate
standard for the determination of what
constitutes suppressible obscene material
with respect to such minors. That such a
separate standard exists is apparent from
case law analysis.
Secondly, it will endeavor to provide
suggestions and caveats for the formulation
of this separate standard to draftsmen who
may presently be working on remedial ob-
scenity legislation. It will also explore pos-
sible collateral aids to implement the en-




In regard to youth it has always been
assumed in law that the government has a
special responsibility and authority. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court:
A democratic society rests, for its con-
tinuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity
as citizens, with all that implies. It may se-
cure this against impeding restraints and
dangers within a broad range of selection. 1 2
Is it equally true that the law has al-
ways upheld the authority of government
to prohibit that which offends public mor-
ality precisely because of its immoral char-
acter?" It is particularly important to note
here that while the police power is the
means by which the state acts to protect
public morality it normally will not be ex-
ercised if in such exercise the state inter-
feres with freedoms guaranteed under the
first amendment. In the case of Prince v.
Massachusetts,'4 it was established that in
the realm of religious freedom the state has
the right to restrict the child if such re-
striction is deemed necessary to protect the
12Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168
(1943).
'3 Whelan, Censorship and the Constitutional
Concept of Morality, 53 GEO. L.J. 547 (1955).
For a discussion of the differences between law
and morality see ST. JOHN-STEVAs, LIFE, DEATH
AND THE LAW (1961).
14 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
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child. (Although if such action were di-
rected against an adult it would be clearly
unconstitutional as an abridgement of his
first amendment freedom.) Obviously, if
religious freedom can be restricted, so also
can freedom of speech be restricted in a
child for his protection. It follows, there-
fore, that if the state determines that a
restriction of a child's freedom, in the area
of reading or scrutinizing certain materials,
is necessary for his protection the exercise
of police power should be justified in re-
straining the child from examining such
materials. As a corollary to such child re-
straint, it follows further that adults may be
restrained from selling such material to
children even though such restraint limits
to some extent the guarantee of free speech
and free press which the adult may other-
wise claim.
A unanimous Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Swayne, has said:
The foundation of a republic is the virtue
of its citizens. They are at once sovereigns
and subjects. As the foundation is under-
mined, the structure is weakened. When it
is destroyed the fabric must fall. Such is
the voice of history.' 5
With respect to the question of who is to
determine what is violative of public mor-
ality, the Supreme Court has said:
Under our system that power is lodged in
the legislative branch of the government.
It belongs to that department to exert what
are known as police powers of the State,
and to determine, primarily, what measures
are appropriate or needful for the protec-
tion of the public morals, the public health,
or the public safety.' 6
In this connection an important considera-
"5Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441, 450
(1874).
16 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660 (1887).
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tion in dealing with legislation restrictive of
free speech is the division of responsibility
between the legislature and the court in
determining whether a certain type of ex-
pression produces evil results. 17 It is not
the function of the court to debate the wis-
dom of a legislative determination that ob-
scene material can cause a moral deteriora-
tion in the young and a resultant ten-
dency toward juvenile delinquency. In an
area where the psychological experts are
so divided, the policy decision is the legis-
lature's, not the courts'. This is not to say
that the courts cannot, in a due-process
case, find that the legislative inferences
from available data are so unreasonable
and arbitrary as to be invalid. It is sub-
mitted that the courts' share of the respon-
sibility is to accept the legislative judgment
of the causal relationship between obscene
material and societal evil as valid if not un-
reasonable-not to accept it as valid only
if convinced it is sound.
The concern of the various communities
throughout this country and, in fact
throughout the world with respect to ob-
scenity has been long established."" These
communities, after exhaustive analysis of
the pros and cons as to the deleterious
effect of obscene material, have determined
17 See Richardson, Freedom of Expression and
the Function of Courts, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1951).
1 This concern has been noted by Mr. Justice
Brennan in Roth where he stated that:
But implicit in the history of the First Amend-
ment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance. This re-
jection for that reason is mirrored in the uni-
versal judgment that obscenity should be re-
strained, reflected in the international agree-
ment of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws
of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity
laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to
1956. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957).
that obscenity corrupts morals and char-
acter and should be eliminated. 19 This opin-
ion is particularly evident with respect to
children. Since the communities have
strongly indicated their position concern-
ing the adverse effect of obscenity on the
character and morality of children, it fol-
lows that the legislature is obligated to
take all necessary and proper legal steps
consistent with constitutional guarantees of
freedom of expression to support the right
of parents to deal with the morals of their
children as they see fit.
Professor Louis Henkin, in a recent ar-
ticle, admits that protection of the morals
of children requires separate obscenity leg-
islation for minors,'2 although he has re-
cently challenged the conclusion that ob-
scenity is a proper object of legislative so-
cial regulation under the aegis of public
morality where adults are concerned. 21 He
questions whether in the balance of free-
dom and authority under the scrutiny of
the Constitution the public's interest in
suppressing obscenity outweighs the ex-
ponent's freedom of expression.
According to Professor Henkin, chang-
ing values may have dissipated notions
once deemed fundamental to morality, and
countervailing values of freedom, growing
19 Such community studies in obscenity may be
best illustrated by the reports of the New York
State Legislative Committee. They contain,
inter alia, exhibits of material deemed objection-
able, expert testimony on what is obscene, pro-
posed statutes, recently enacted laws, and New
York court cases. The committee has published
the following studies: Legislative Document Nos.
15 (1951), 64 (1952), 37 (1954), 37 (1955), 32
(1956), 83 (1957), 85 (1958), 83 (1960), 77
(1962), and 81 (1963).
20 Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin
of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391, 413
(1963).
211d. at 406.
in potency, may now outweigh moral
values on the constitutional scale.
Narrowing in on his argument, he posits
that abhorrence of obscenity has its roots
in religion and its suppression achieves no
other apparent result than a support of re-
ligious belief. Absent any utilitarian social
basis for obscenity control, he concludes
that it may well be deemed an unreason-
able interference by government in the area
of private morality. His viewpoint has
since been adopted by at least one other
expert. 22
In reply to Professor Henkin one need
merely point out that hard core pornog-
raphy is all that may be banned from the
adult today. If his argument is made as
a defense of the pornographer then the an-
swer is obvious-hard core pornography is
utterly without any redeeming social im-
portance. The repugnance and disgust
which arises naturally upon exposure to
hard core pornography is based not upon
religious teaching and tradition but upon
an instinctive rejection of corruption and
decay. That which is filthy and disgusting
cannot be amusing. Restraints upon por-
nographers have the utilitarian value of re-
leasing presses for material that may at
least produce some slight social benefit,
if only adult level amusement. The produc-
tion and commercial exploitation of hard
core pornography is in the public domain
and distinguishable from activity such as
private blasphemy or private sacrilege
which may be contrary to public morality
but still may not be properly subject to
legal restraint.
22 Gerber, A Suggested Solution To The Riddle
of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 834, 851
(1964).
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b) Clear and Present Danger
Another approach through case law can
be taken in an attempt to establish the
separate classification of minors in ob-
scenity control, in addition to the public
morality, police power justification.
The principal cases raising the issue of
freedom of communication in recent years
have involved "speech" found to be part
of a pattern of subversive action believed
to endanger the safety of the nation. If
such speech creates a clear and present
danger of any undesirable consequence at
which the state may aim, it may be sup-
pressed. Adopting the language of Chief
Judge Learned Hand, the Supreme Court
has said:
In each case [courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the "evil", discounted by its im-
probability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger
.... We adopt this statement of the rule.
As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it
is as succinct and inclusive as any other we
might devise at this time. It takes into
consideration those factors which we deem
relevant, and relates their significances.
More we cannot expect from words. 23
It has been argued that no responsible
court, in modern times, has held or as-
serted that an obscene item is dangerous
because it might incite the reader or viewer
to perform a criminal act.24 Hence, if the
application of the clear-and-present-danger
rule is interpreted as being limited to that
which incites to violence or crime, a causal
relationship cannot be established between
obscenity and violence; hence, the rule is
not applicable. This seems to be the view
23 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510
(1951).
24 Gerber, supra note 22, at 851.
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of Mr. Justice Black and others who have
supported him.
2 5
Although it is true that one item of ob-
scenity may be deemed insignificant in it-
self, the torrential flood of obscenity which
is saturating today's young may well be an
inducement to perversion and juvenile de-
linquency.2 , The problem is how to prove it.
With respect to this condition, the Su-
preme Court of the United States, which
may well be called a responsible court, has
stated as recently as 1948 that "we recog-
nize the importance of the exercise of a
state's police power to minimize all in-
centives to crime, particularly in the field
of sanguinary or salacious publications
with their stimulation of juvenile delin-
quency.
27
The argument against any significant
causal relationship between juvenile de-
linquency and obscene material can be
traced to a report which originally was
cited in the concurring opinion of Judge
Frank in United States v. Roth.2 8 It was
given still wider publicity by the Ameri-
25 To those who take this view, what is meant
by "incitement" and what constitutes "incite-
ment" would presumably present the same ques-
tions of degree and the same inquiries into scien-
ter, purpose and gravity which the Court con-
sidered in the Dennis case.
26 "Obscenity, pornography, salacious literature
-whatever you may call it-is a two billion
dollar a year racket in the United States .... It
is shocking when we realize that 75%-90% of
the materials peddled by these perverted profiteers
fall into the hands of unwary young people."
Address by Francis Cardinal Spellman, Grand
Aerie Convention Banquet, Denver Hilton Ho-
tel, August 6, 1964.
27Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 503, 510
(1947).
2s 237 F.2d 796, 815 (2d Cir. 1956), afl'd, 354
U.S. 476 (1957).
can Law Institute which quoted from the
report in support of its obscenity definition
in its 1957 draft of the Model Penal
Code. 29 This definition was the basis for
the present Supreme Court definition of
obscenity as set forth in Roth v. United
States.2
The report, which was prepared by Dr.
Marie Jahoda, was summarized by her, in
part, as follows:
1. (In regard to the assumption that read-
ing about prurient sex or violence or
crime leads to anti-social actions, espe-
cially juvenile delinquency) there exists
no research evidence either to prove or
disprove this assumption definitely.
2. Experts on juvenile delinquency agree
there is no single cause.
3. With regard to the impact of literature
on the mind of the reader . . . there is
a vast overlap in content between all
media of mass communications. . . . It
is virtually impossible to isolate the im-
pact of one of these media on a popu-
lation exposed to all of them.
It is likely . . . that excessive reading of
comic books will intensify in children
those qualities which drove them to the
comic book world to begin with ...
It should be noted that insofar as causal
sequence is implied, insecurity and mal-
adjustment in a child must precede this
exposure to the written word in order
to lead to those potential effects. Un-
fortunately, perhaps the reading of
Shakespeare's tragedies or of Ander-
son's and Grimm's fairy tales do much
the same harm."'
Since 1957, many additional investiga-
tions have been made in the area of re-
search as to the causes of juvenile delin-
quency. Some of what has been produced
29 § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
30 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
31 Supra note 29.
has contradicted the Jahoda report con-
clusions. The report was admittedly based
upon lack of research evidence, and con-
fined strictly to the relationship between
crime comics and juvenile delinquency.
The Committee on Public Health of the
New York Academy of Medicine in 1963
strongly recommended "legislation de-
signed to make salacious literature un-
available to minors by prohibiting sale of
it to them," after the Committee con-
cluded:
Although some adolescents may not be af-
fected by the reading of salacious litera-
ture, others may be more vulnerable. Such
reading . . . interferes with the develop-
ment of a healthy attitude and respect for
the opposite sex....
Behavior is complex. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to prove scientifically that a
direct causal relation exists between libidi-
nous literature and socially unaccepted con-
duct. Yet, it is undeniable that there has
been a resurgence of venereal disease, par-
ticularly among teen-age youth, and that
the rate of illegitimacy is climbing. . . .It
can be asserted ... that the perusal of erotic
literature has the potentiality of inciting
some young persons to enter into illicit sex
relations and thus leading them into prom-
iscuity, illegitimacy and venereal disease. 32
Another cautious commentator, after
concluding from a review of the available
empirical data that "a significant portion
of our society is sexually aroused to some
extent by some form of sex stimuli in pic-
tures and probably in books," has consid-
ered reasonable the proposition that the
portrayal of nudity or sexual activity detri-
mentally affects the formation of attitudes,
particularly among the young: "Where no
32 Statement By The New York Academy of
Medicine Prepared by the Committee on Public
Health, 39 BULL. OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF MED.
545-46 (1963).
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strong sexual attitudes exist a priori, either
because of a person's youth or his sexual
naivete, one would expect that the expo-
sure to sexual stimuli would have its strong-
est effect."'33
Moreover, there is evidence of psycho-
logical harm to young persons from the
material at issue. In one view, "such
reading encourages a morbid preoccupa-
tion with sex. . . . It is said to contribute
to perversion. In the opinion of some psy-
chiatrists, it may have an especially detri-
mental effect on disturbed adolescents. 34
Others have concluded from studies of
"persons who reflect considerable sexual
guilt and sexual identification problems"
that "the presentation of sexual materials,
for some persons, is an aversive or dis-
ruptive experience. 33 Although psychia-
trists disagree as to the particular effects of
this material, there appears to be a consen-
sus that the danger of emotional harm is
greatest for the young. 30
Another study, reported by Dr. Fredric
Wertham in 1954, is notable for its thor-
oughness and objectivity in the examina-
tion of psychological aberrations in chil-
dren caused by exposure to deleterious
material. 37 The psychiatric patients, for the
most part children, could only have as-
33 Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The
Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the
Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009,
1032, 1035, 1039 (1962).
34 Supra note 32.
35 Supra note 32, at 1036.
36 PAUL & SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OB-
SCENITY IN THE MAIL (1961).
37 WERTHAM, SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT ch.
VI (1954). See also LORANG, THE EFFECT OF
READING ON MORAL CONDUCT AND EMOTIONAL
EXPERIENCE 23 n.4 (1945); St. John-Stevas,
Obscenity, Literature and the Law, 3 CATHOLIC
LAW. 303, 306 (1957).
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sumed their familiarity with obscene mat-
ters from the books and magazines which
they had read. These children could not
have brought to their reading any pre-exist-
ing obscenity: the literature which they
read caused the perversions from which
they suffered. The process is something
like the following: (1) some objective
stimulus-the obscene book or magazine;
(2) a mental reaction and then an emo-
tional one; (3) "a physical and physio-
logical expression, glandular or muscular,
of the mental and emotional state." The
result of this process is some promiscuous
sexual activity which is prompted by the
reading material. Obscenity, therefore, does
exist in the novel or magazine and is the
occasion as well as the proximate cause of
moral harm in the individual who is read-
ing.
Dr. Jahoda's view is also in direct op-
position to that of psychologists such as
Dr. George W. Henry, Professor of Clin-
ical Psychology at Cornell University. Dr.
Henry has affirmed that children can "be
sexually perverted by looking at, by study-
ing, and by dwelling upon the photos of
this nature and content. . . ." In his opin-
ion, "a large proportion of the population"
is susceptible to the evil influences of ob-
scene publications. 8 In a similar vein Dr.
Benjamin Karpman, Chief Psychotherapist
at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington,
D.C., has testified in regard to the effects
of obscenity that "you can take a perfect-
ly healthy boy or girl and by exposing
them to abnormalities you can virtually
crystallize and settle their habits for the
3 Testimony before the U.S. Congress, SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY, Rep. No. 2381, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10, 11 (1956).
rest of their lives." He found that "there is
a direct relationship between juvenile de-
linquency, sex life, and pornographic lit-
erature." 19
Restating the argument which may be
made against those who still insist on more
empirical evidence before a causal relation-
ship can be established between juvenile
delinquency and the reading or viewing of
obscene material, it appears that there is
abundant psychological clinical evidence
today of a correlation between the constant
exposure to obscene material and criminal
action. In reaching this conclusion psy-
chology uses the tools proper to its field
and understands the law of causality in a
way that recognizes the peculiar character-
istics of the human personality and that
has proved not only realistic but produc-
tive of beneficial results in mental health
and conduct.4 0
Even if a particular court would still in-
sist that a causal relation has not been
scientifically established through such psy-
chological studies, one can cite J. Edgar
Hoover's statement that "we cannot afford
to wait for an answer from psychiatrists as
to the extent that it [obscene material]
affects the youth's mind. We do know that
sex crime is associated with pornography."'41
With respect then to the approach to the
separate standard through the clear-and-
present-danger test, it can best be summed
up by saying that the scope of the test
is not clear today with respect to obscenity
control. The gravity of the danger required
for the disturbance of various types of
39 Id. at 12.
40 MURPHY, CENSORSHIP: GOVERNMENT AND OB-
SCENITY ch. 9 (1963).
41 Letter From J. Edgar Hoover to All Law En-
forcement Officials, January 1, 1960.
speech and press is so great that it is diffi-
cult to determine to what extent the doc-
trine is still viable in areas other than sub-
versive speech. Its employment, therefore,
as a sole justification for a separate stand-
ard for minors in the area of obscenity
control is unwise. In the words of Paul A.
Freund, "no matter how rapidly we utter
the phrase 'clear and present danger' or
how closely we hyphenate the words, they
are not a substitute for the weighing of
values." 4"
The existence of the separate standard is
best established through a state's right to
limit the first amendment freedoms of chil-
dren in protection of public morality. The
evidence of causal relationship between
constant exposure of children to obscer.e
materials and moral degeneracy and juve-
nile delinquency, even though conflicting,
can certainly justify a legislative decision
to act in this area despite the fact that it
results in some curtailment of adult free-
dom of press.
The Separate Standard
Recognizing, therefore, that minors have
a separate status in law with respect to
the sale to them of obscene material, is the
separate status one which will be recog-
nized merely in the procedural area or
will it affect the substantive law as well?
In other words, will hard core pornog-
raphy be defined as the sole standard for
the suppression of obscenity in sales to
minors, with perhaps the requirement of
scienter modified as to such sales, or will
that which is deemed suppressible obscen-
ity be defined as more than hard core por-
nography coupled with a scienter require-
42 FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME
COURT 27-28 (1950).
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ment modification where sales to minors
are involved?
Underlying any discussion as to the
mode in which the legislature can act with
respect to the dissemination of obscene
materials to minors is the case of Butler v.
Michigan.4 3 The Supreme Court, in this
case, invalidated as arbitrary a Michigan
statute prohibiting the sale to anyone of
any material which would tend to have a
deleterious influence upon youth. Counsel
for the State of Michigan insisted that the
statute was enacted to protect the children
within Michigan from the possible effect
that might result from seeing the type of
material that was prohibited. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the undivided
Court, however, stated that the legislation
did not reasonably restrict the evil with
which it was said to deal. Although the
Court had the opportunity to hold that a
state could not separately legislate in the
area of obscenity with regard to children,
it did not choose to so rule. Instead, it
approvingly made reference to another
Michigan statute which was specifically de-
signed to protect minors by prohibiting the
sale to them of material which would tend
to corrupt their morals. From this unani-
mous Supreme Court decision it can be
inferred that legislation restricting the sale
of certain materials to minors, which ma-
terial would be judged by a child's stand-
ards, would be constitutional.
Indeed, as recently as 1960, a federal
court stated by way of dictum:
Neither our ruling here nor anything we
have said should be construed as preclud-
ing an effective state policy of safeguard-
ing minors against publications which,
though not obscene when judged by the
standards of the community as a whole,
may, nevertheless, be thought to have a
43 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
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corrupting influence on the morals of
youth. While we have no occasion here to
pass on the constitutionality of such a law,
it would seem that a state might enact a
valid statute "specifically designed to pro-
tect its children" from suggestive books and
magazines that are not too rugged for
grown men and women, without at the
same time burning the house down to
roast the pig by restricting everyone else
to reading such fiction as Boy's Life at the
magazine stand and The Five Little Pep-
pers at the bookstand. 44
Further justification for this inference
can be found in the statement of Mr.
Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice
Goldberg, in the Jacobellis case wherein it
was said, citing the Settle case as an ex-
ample:
We recognize the legitimate and indeed
exigent interest of the States and localities
throughout the Nation in preventing the
dissemination of material deemed harmful
to children. But that interest does not jus-
tify a total suppression of such material,
the effect of which would be to "reduce the
adult population . . . to reading only what
is fit for children." State and local authori-
ties might well consider whether their ob-
jectives in this area would be better served
by laws aimed specifically at preventing
distribution of objectionable material to
children, rather than at totally prohibiting
its dissemination. Since the present convic-
tion is based upon exhibition of the film
to the public at large and not upon its ex-
hibition to children, the judgment must be
reviewed under the strict standard appli-
cable in determining the scope of the ex-
pression that is protected by the Constitu-
tion.45
Mr. Justice Warren, joined by Mr. Jus-
tice Clark, expressed a similar view in a
dissent:
44 In re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241,
247 (E.D. La. 1960).
45 Supra note 2, at 195.
We are told that only "hard core pornog-
raphy" should be denied the protection of
the First Amendment. But who can define
"hard core pornography" with any greater
clarity than "obscenity"? And even if we
were to retreat to that position, we would
soon be faced with the need to define that
term just as we now are faced with the
need to define "obscenity." Meanwhile,
those who profit from the commercial ex-
ploitation of obscenity would continue to
ply their trade unmolested.
In my opinion, the use to which various
materials are put-not just the words and
pictures themselves-must be considered in
determining whether or not the materials
are obscene. A technical or legal treatise
on pornography may well be inoffensive
under most circumstances but at the same
time, "obscene" in the extreme when sold
or displayed to children. 46
The Formulation of a Separate Standard
Once it is accepted that a separate
standard for children is constitutional, it
must be appreciated that laws to protect
children against obscenity present prob-
lems of delineating standards and espe-
cially of definiteness and precision if at-
tempts are made to define the kinds of
material that are forbidden on the ground
that they are deleterious to a child. A
general description which bars material
that "for a minor is obscene when it is
presented in a salacious manner" may well
be deemed sufficient to make for a con-
stitutionally acceptable statute in itself
when it is directed solely at barring sales
to minors.
It is submitted that such general termi-
nology should be deemed constitutionally
acceptable as "permissibly uncertain"
against the objection of vagueness and in-
definiteness just as it has been in the
46 Supra note 2, at 201.
280
obscenity cases involving the general pub-
lic.4 7 If the legislative intent is clearly
stated as a preamble to such a separate
statute it should require of the courts the
adoption of more rigid standards in the
scrutiny of alleged obscene matter when
viewed in its potential effect on minors
rather than on adults. 4 Again, it should
be emphasized that it is not the function
of the courts to question the wisdom of
legislative determination.
The practical result, nevertheless, will
be that many courts may be reluctant to
venture much beyond hard core pornog-
raphy in suppressing material under such
a general statute unless the legislature
goes further and carefully and accurately
describes the material forbidden to youth.
This reluctance, however, may be over-
come by the employment of expert testi-
mony in each individual case on the ques-
tion of whether the particular material is
deleterious to minors, if the court considers
such aid necessary. 49
Such legislation will certainly meet with
strong opposition as will any other type
of legislation in this field, however it is
worded. According to Professors Lockhart
and McClure:
To prohibit dealers from exhibiting within
the view of adolescents books and maga-
zines that can be sold only to adults would
raise the additional problem of undue in-
terference with the material's primary au-
dience. Beyond these obstacles is the dis-
rupting effect of "adult only" counters or
shelves in book stores and newsstands, for
4 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 503, 518
(1947).
48 People v. Finkelstein, 156 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Magis.
Ct. 1955).
4 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscen-
ity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 99 (1960).
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the "adult only" label would serve only to
attract adolescents eager for a look at the
forbidden fruit and would make it difficult
for the dealer to prevent adolescent shop-
lifting of the books and magazines. To
avoid these difficulties cautious dealers
might well decide to abandon all books and
magazines claimed by anyone to be unsuit-
able for adolescents. 50
Balancing the interests between the
rights of parents and minors to obtain
protection against material which adversely
affects youth and the economic loss which
might possibly result to booksellers if ob-
scene material is banned from minors, it
seems clear that courts will resolve any
conflict in favor of the parents and minors
since the danger to these persons is much
greater than the possible monetary loss to
booksellers which the avoidance of such
danger may occasion.
A reading of the majority opinion of the
New York Court of Appeals in the Book-
case decision will support this conclusion.
Judge Van Voorhis very carefully estab-
lished that the issue before the court was
not whether the material was obscene un-
der a separate standard for minors, but
"whether the legislature can constitution-
ally restrict, the sale . . . of material to
minors . . . for the reason that it is prin-
cipally devoted to the subject of illicit sex
or sexual immorality." The opinion in-
timates clearly that if the particular clause
objected to was deleted from the statute,
the material under consideration might
well have been deemed obscene with re-
spect to minors and, therefore, sales to
them made suppressible. In the words of
the court:
It is noteworthy that the 1954 Report to
the legislature of the Committee on whose
50 Id. at 86.
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recommendation the present Section 484-h
of the Penal Law was originally adopted,
recommended an addition to the obscenity
statute proposed to be known as Section
1141-b, which would have forbidden the
commercial distribution to minors of ma-
terial "which, for a minor, is obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting
.... "Such a recognition that printed ma-
terial or pictures may be classified as ob-
scene for minors which would not be so for
adults would have been in accord with
statutes adopted in a number of other
jurisdictions. . . . Appellants, it may be re-
peated, have not been convicted of selling
an obscene book to a minor, but one which
is principally devoted to descriptions of il-
licit sex or sexual immorality, unrelated to
whether the book is obscene. The People
concede that no issue of obscenity is before
the Court on this appeal. 51
Legislative Suggestions
While it is true that the New York
Court of Appeals has in effect pronounced
in advance that it will declare constitutional
a statute which suppresses sales to minors
of material "which is obscene to a minor
when presented in a salacious manner," the
effectiveness of such statute is highly ques-
tionable on a law enforcement level. Our
law enforcement officers, as is pointed out
elsewhere in this issue, 52 need definitive
guides to assist them in determining against
what materials they should proceed. Again,
unless the legislature carefully spells out
what type of materials it has determined
are deleterious to minors, a court will have
no recourse other than to usurp the legis-
lative prerogative on this point.
The main obstacle which the draftsman
faces when he undertakes to draft a statute
which itemizes such material in a series of
51 Supra note 7, at 416, 201 N.E.2d at 18, 252
N.Y.S.2d at 438-39.
52 Sullivan, Obscenity: Police Enforcement Prob-
lems, infra at 301.
specific descriptions is the fact that in
order to avoid a "vagueness and indefinite"
objection he must be so specific that his
resultant description will be so unduly nar-
row that it will exclude much of the ma-
terial he would wish to include.
A great deal of the difficulty in this area
stems from Winters v. New York.5 3 In
this case the Supreme Court of the United
States considered the constitutionality of
a New York statute which made it a
criminal offense to publish or distribute
publications "principally made up of crim-
inal news, police reports or accounts of
criminal deeds or pictures or stories of
deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime." The
statute had been previously interpreted by
the New York Court of Appeals to be
aimed at publications in which collections
of accounts of criminal deeds of bloodshed
or lust are so massed as to render them
vehicles for inciting violence and depraved
crimes against the person. Six members of
the Supreme Court held, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Reed, that even as so inter-
preted by the court of appeals the statute
did not set up a sufficiently definite stand-
ard of conduct:
When a legislative body concludes that the
mores of the community call for an ex-
tension of the impermissible limits, an en-
actment aimed at the evil is plainly within
its power, if it does not transgress the boun-
daries fixed by the Constitution for free-
dom of expression. The standards of cer-
tainty in statutes punishing for offenses is
higher than in those depending primarily
upon civil sanction for enforcement. The
crime "must be defined with appropriate
definiteness."
We think fair use of collections of pictures
and stories would be interdicted because of
the utter impossibility of the actor or the
53 Supra note 27.
trier to know where this new standard of
guilt would draw the line between the al-
lowable and the forbidden publications. No
intent or purpose is required-no inde-
cency or obscenity in any sense hereto-
fore known to the law. "So massed as to
incite to crime" can become meaningful
only by concrete instances. 54
While the Supreme Court did not ex-
plicitly outlaw all restraints on material
dealing with violence in itself, it would
seem that the almost inevitable conclusion
one may draw from the Winters case is
that it is impossible today to draft a statute
which would validly ban the "pornography
of violence." It may be wise, therefore, to
leave this aspect of obscenity outside the
area of legal controls and depend upon
community action for its suppression from
children.
A statute which attempts to define what
is obscene to a minor should be preceded
by a clear statement of legislative intent
as to why such separate obscenity legisla-
tion is deemed necessary. The statute
should then declare in general terms that
"sales to minors of material which to a
minor is obscene when presented in a
salacious manner" are prohibited. The
statute should then proceed, in separate
sections, to itemize specifically by descrip-
tion certain material which falls within the
general exclusion clause. It should be
clearly spelled out that such enumeration
is employed only to illustrate and not to
limit the applicability of the statute solely
to the specifically described examples. A
severability clause should be made part
of such statute to preserve it in the event
that any of the separate itemizations are
later interpreted as vague and unenforce-
able. The number of descriptions which
54, 4t 515, 519.
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such statute may contain is dependent
completely upon the expertise of the
draftsman and his ability to express exactly
the limits of the proscribed material.
An example of such description is the
following:
"Pictures of nude or partially denuded
figures, posed or presented in a manner to
provoke or arouse lust or passion or to
exploit sex, lust or perversion. '5 5 Beyond
this rather obvious depiction, the task be-
comes extremely difficult and the way
fraught with peril. This is not to say how-
ever that it cannot be done. How well it
can be done will depend upon the astute-
ness of the lawyers involved and the facil-
ity of the draftsman's quill.56
Collateral Aids
Advisory Committee
No matter how specific a statute is
drawn which restricts the sale of obscene
material to minors, law enforcement of-
ficials will find great difficulty in predeter-
mining the material which falls within the
statute in advance of a court determination.
As an aid to officials in this area it is sug-
gested that a permanent advisory commit-
tee be established by the state or munici-
pality, to be staffed by qualified legal,
psychological and sociological experts in
the field of obscenity control. This com-
mittee would function primarily as an ad-
visory board to law enforcement officials,
indicating to them what, in its opinion,
would be adult-level material in the current
55 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 484-h. But see People v.
Kaplan, - Misc.2d -, 252 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y.C.
Crim. Ct. 1964), which ruled this clause void for
vagueness.
56 See For Adults Only: The Constitutionality of
Governmental Film Censorship by Age Classi-
fication, 69 YALE L.J. 141 (1959).
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book market. Membership on such com-
mittee would serve also to establish the
members, in part, as qualified experts in
any later court action on the issue of ob-
scenity in a particular publication under
prosecution. The activity of such commit-
tee would be of immeasurable aid to those
faced with the problems of operating under
any obscenity control statute, regardless
of how clearly it is worded.
Unfortunately, such committee might
well be attacked as an illegal prior re-
straint since its determination of obscenity
would be made in advance of any hearing
on the question. It should be noted, how-
ever, that although any prior restraint by
its very nature is offensive to constitutional
principles, its use is not per se prohibited.
The Supreme Court has, in many in-
stances, considered the constitutionality of
censorship statutes, especially those statutes
relating to obscene materials. Although the
Court in each of these cases held the par-
ticular provisions of the statutes in ques-
tion to be unconstitutional, it has never
said that prior restraint itself was uncon-
stitutional. It has very carefully avoided
this issue. By implication it is clear that
given a justified reason for such legislation,
coupled with adequate constitutional safe-
guards, such legislation would probably
be held not to violate constitutional safe-
guards.
Support for the above statements is de-
rived from the Supreme Court case of Ban-
tam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan.57 Involved in
this case was the constitutionality of a
Commission, created by the Rhode Island
Legislature, whose purpose was to educate
the public as to what materials were ob-
scene, to investigate and recommend the
57 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
prosecution of violators of the obscenity
statutes, to combat juvenile delinquency
and to encourage morality in youth. The
Court, however, did not hold the legisla-
tion creating the Commission to be un-
constitutional, but held that certain acts
of the Commission were unconstitutional,
i.e., the intimidation of booksellers. Mr.
Justice Clark, who concurred in the result,
indicated that he felt that even in light of
this decision the Rhode Island Commission
would still be free to publicize its feelings,
to solicit and support the public in pre-
venting dissemination of deleterious ma-
terial to minors, to furnish its findings to
publishers, distributors, retailers and law
enforcement officials and to seek the aid of
such law enforcement officials in prose-
cuting offenders.
In drafting a prior restraint statute, it
would be necessary to incorporate several
other provisions not utilized in the Rhode
Island Resolution in order to have a more
effective statute and to have procedural
safeguards. There must be a provision for
an appeal from the committee's determina-
tion. This is necessary to satisfy the re-
quirement of judicial supervision espoused
by Mr. Justice Brennan in the Bantam
Books case.
In order to strengthen the statute there
should be incorporated some form of noti-
fication to be put on the book or magazine
by the wholesaler or retailer that the Com-
mission has found the book to be objec-
tionable to children. This would not pre-
vent a parent from buying the so labeled
book for his or her child to read if the
parent so desired. The retailer could also
disregard the Commission's recommenda-
tion and await a summons and then litigate
the obscenity issue or could proceed by
way of injunction against the Commission
as to the particular book and thus have the
question of obscenity decided by the court.
Although the problem created by using
the "adults only" notification-notoriety of
the book so labeled-is recognized, the
general benefit of the statute to the com-
munity would far outweigh this short-
coming.
Tie-In Statutes
Another problem which arises out of
separate statutes directed at restricting ob-
scene materials from minors is that of ef-
fective prosecution. On the adult level,
prosecutions are very effective when law
enforcement officials utilize injunctive re-
lief and sequester all the allegedly obscene
material pending a court determination.
This removes the book from the market
immediately and effectively ties the hands
of the bookseller until the outcome of the
suit.
When prosecuting under a minor statute,
however, sequestration of the material is
not an available remedy since the material
is still saleable to adults and such sales
cannot be proscribed.
As a partial solution to this problem it
is suggested that communities enact a "tie-
in sale" statute similar to the following
New York State statute, but re-enacted to
be applicable to that which is obscene to
minors:
Distribution of indecent articles; tie-in sales.
-No person, co-partnership or corpora-
tion shall as a condition to a sale, alloca-
tion, consignment or delivery for resale of
any paper, magazine, book, periodical or
publication require that the purchaser or
consignee receive for resale any other ar-
ticle, book or other publication reasonably
believed by the purchaser or consignee to
be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, inde-
cent or disgusting nor shall any person,
co-partnership or corporation, deny or
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threaten to deny any franchise or impose
or threaten to impose any penalty, financial
or otherwise, by reason of the failure of
any person to accept such articles, books,
or publications, or by reason of the return
thereof.
A violation of this section shall be a mis-
demeanor.58
With such a statute on the books, a
community can approach a bookseller who
is attempting to cooperate with commu-
nity activity in obscenity control and com-
pel removal of a great deal of material
from the magazine racks and bookshelves
in one action. Again, however, the coop-
eration of the bookseller is necessary to
make such legislation effective.
Conclusion
It is undeniably true that, while a con-
stitutionally acceptable statute can be
drafted for the restriction of material from
minors, which to a minor is obscene, the
law is a clumsy instrument to use as a sole
solution to this problem. Good law is nec-
essarily minimal in order to allow maxi-
mum freedom and individual differences
and in order to be based on generally held
convictions.5 Law can never substitute for
individual responsibility.
The suggestions for legislation which
have been made in this article of necessity
will result only in an effective minimal
protection to youth in the matter of ob-
scenity control. The main challenge that
confronts any community today is the need
for educating our adult population to an
(continued on page 308)
58 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1141-c.
59 See the Statement of the Catholic Bishops of
the United States printed in HAROLD GARDINER,
CATHOLIC VIEWPOINT ON CENSORSHIP 188
(1958).
 
